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Paternalist Deception in the Lotus Sūtra: 
A Normative Assessment 
Charles A. Goodman1 
 
Abstract 
The Lotus Sūtra repeatedly asserts the moral permissibility, in cer-
tain circumstances, of deceiving others for their own benefit.  
The examples it uses to illustrate this view have the features of 
weak paternalism, but the real-world applications it endorses 
would today be considered strong paternalism.  We can explain 
this puzzling feature of the text by noting that according to 
Mahāyāna Buddhists, normal, ordinary people are so irrational 
that they are relevantly similar to the insane.  Kant’s determined 
anti-paternalism, by contrast, relies on an obligation to see oth-
ers as rational, which can be read in several ways.  Recent work in 
psychology provides support for the Lotus Sūtra’s philosophical 
anthropology while undermining the plausibility of Kant’s ver-
sion.  But this result does not necessarily lead to an endorsement 
of political paternalism, since politicians are not qualified to 
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wield such power.  Some spiritual teachers, however, may be mo-
rally permitted to benefit their students by deceiving them.  
     
Autonomy, Paternalism, and Appropriate Means 
The Lotus Sūtra has had a profound influence on the lives of hundreds of 
millions of people, mainly in East Asia. Although many have turned to it 
for advice about how to live, and although it does contain ethical guid-
ance, the Lotus Sūtra is not primarily a work of ethics. But we do find in 
the text, repeated over and over again, a particular kind of moral view; a 
view, in fact, that is potentially both troubling and controversial. Nu-
merous passages in the Lotus Sūtra present us with wise, compassionate 
figures who assist others by lying to them, or at least, making misleading 
statements to them. Some ethicists in the Western tradition, most nota-
bly Immanuel Kant, would deny the moral permissibility of this way of 
helping others. Could spiritual teachers such as the Buddha be justified 
in using deception to promote the happiness and spiritual growth of 
their students? Or is there a moral error at the heart of the Lotus Sūtra? 
There is already a rich tradition of scholarly inquiry into the Lotus 
Sūtra. Therefore, in investigating the question of paternalist deception in 
that text, I do not need to start from scratch. Damien Keown and Gene 
Reeves, among other scholars, have already explored these issues; I shall 
summarize a few of their conclusions. The benevolent lies discussed in 
the Lotus Sūtra are classified under the important Buddhist concept of 
upāya. The most common translation of this term is “skillful means,” but 
Gene Reeves suggests it should be rendered as “appropriate means” (Ap-
propriate 382). Doctrinally, the concept of appropriate means is repeated-
ly used to account for the existence of the Way of the Disciples (Skt. 
śrāvaka-yāna) as one authentic form of the Buddha’s religion, and to ex-
plain the differences between that teaching and the Mahāyāna.  
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From a Western point of view, the benevolent lies in question 
would evidently count as paternalism. This is deceptive, rather than 
coercive, paternalism: the Lotus Sūtra never explicitly endorses paternal-
ist uses of physical force, and at one point seems to reject them.2 Moreo-
ver, as Keown points out, in most of the parables, the characters in the 
stories who benefit from being deceived are not fully rational: they are 
children, or mentally disturbed, or tired and distressed, and so on (373). 
So if we focus on these stories, what the Lotus Sūtra endorses would 
count as weak paternalism, which is the use of coercion or deception to 
get people who are for whatever reason not fully rational to do or allow 
what would be in their best interests. Weak paternalism is not nearly as 
controversial as strong paternalism, in which coercive or deceptive 
means are employed on normal, adult humans whose rationality is not 
impaired by any unusual conditions. But if we bring our attention to the 
doctrinal applications of the parables in question, the people who are 
being deceived are normal adults, including many of the Buddha’s own 
Disciples. So although the parables themselves are examples of weak pa-
ternalism, they are being used to support a view that, by ordinary stan-
dards, appears to count as strong paternalism. 
Having implicitly recognized this point, Keown decides not to 
wrestle with the issues it raises, writing:  
How accurately these parables reflect the underlying truth of the 
situation they purport to represent is, of course, quite another 
topic. Whether the Buddha’s early followers can really be likened 
to deluded children or not is debatable, but it is not a question I 
can enter into here. (373) 
                                                          
2 At Reeves Classic 143, a father attempts to use coercion on his mentally unstable am-
nesiac son. The attempt fails: the son is utterly terrified and falls into a faint. The father 
then decides to resort to paternalist deception instead; he pretends to need stable 
workers and offers his son a job removing dung. 
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I propose to begin where Keown left off, and to consider a question 
closely related to the one he chooses not to answer. If we care about 
whether the ethical perspective of the Lotus Sūtra is substantively de-
fensible, this is undoubtedly what we will have to do. But I shall not con-
sider Keown’s exact question, because I think it frames the issue in an 
unfortunate way. Those practicing the Way of the Disciples are not the 
only ones who may receive misleading teachings from the Buddha. Con-
sider a beginning bodhisattva who forms the aspiration “I will become a 
Buddha,” an aspiration without which one cannot really enter the 
Mahāyāna. But since there is no self, there is no “I” even now, much less 
a persisting self that will exist until the time of Buddhahood. Moreover, 
as Peggy Morgan points out, the Lotus Sūtra’s account of its own composi-
tion and historical setting, in a cosmic assembly of humans and non-
humans on Vulture Peak in the time of Śākyamuni, is literally, historical-
ly false and therefore, at best, itself an example of appropriate means 
(353-56). This account, of course, is addressed to any and all readers of 
the Sūtra. In order for the ethical perspective of the Lotus Sūtra to be de-
fensible, it will have to turn out that all of us who are not fully awake are 
appropriate objects of paternalistic deception. 
In order to explore whether that claim can be made good, it will 
help to examine the arguments that can be offered against paternalism. 
Now if we are looking for an ethical theory that is staunchly opposed to 
benevolent lying, we will find it in the writings of Immanuel Kant. Kant 
notoriously claimed that it would be wrong to lie to a murderer who de-
mands information about the location of his intended victim; when he 
was taken to task for this claim by Benjamin Constant and others, he 
emphatically reasserted and defended it in a piece entitled “On a Sup-
posed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns” (Ellington 63-67). 
 Kant has several main types of arguments available for rejecting 
the idea of benevolent lying; I will discuss one based on the first and 
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three based on the second formulations of the Categorical Imperative. 
The first type of argument is related to the Formula of Universal Law. 
Kant argues that the moral principle that forbids lying is universal, a pri-
ori, exceptionless, and holds in all cases whatsoever, no matter how dis-
astrous the consequences of following it might be.3 The other arguments 
are related to the Formula of Humanity. Kant can say that we have an 
obligation to respect the humanity of others, and that this obligation 
must be honored even at great cost. If we deceive others with the inten-
tion of benefiting them, we show disrespect for their rational nature and 
thus wrong them, even if the results turn out to be helpful. 
 Gene Reeves has helpfully pointed out how different the ethics of 
the Lotus Sūtra is from Kant’s system of immutable, universal laws: 
[T]he Buddha provides four sets of prescriptions which bodhi-
sattvas should follow … But these should be understood, I think, 
not as commandments but more like counsel or rules of thumb. 
Principles, at least in the strongest sense, are eternal, God-given, 
or at least implanted permanently in the nature of things. The 
hōben of the Lotus Sūtra, in contrast, are provisional. Once used, 
they may no longer be useful, precisely because they were appro-
priate for some concrete situation. (Appropriate 387) 
This kind of moral framework shouldn’t really be described as relativist, 
since philosophers typically use the term “relativism” to refer to a 
theory in which whatever a particular individual or culture believes 
about ethics is automatically right for them. Instead, it would make more 
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in fact do not wrong anyone, I nevertheless violate the principle of right in regard to all 
unavoidably necessary statements generally” (Ellington 67). 
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sense to think of the framework as consequentialist; what makes the 
Buddha’s means appropriate is that they work, that they actually suc-
ceed in benefiting sentient beings.4 
 How credible is Kant’s first line of argument? Many philosophers 
today would agree that Kant’s main attempt to justify his own favored 
set of immutable principles, namely, the Formula of Universal Law, is a 
failure. The set of wrong actions, and the set of actions such that they 
wouldn’t work if everyone did them, may overlap, but they pretty clearly 
don’t coincide.5 And Sidgwick’s brilliant and searching examination of 
the “Morality of Common Sense” at the end of the nineteenth century 
should already have convinced us that we can’t expect to extract a set of 
mutually consistent, exceptionless moral principles from the messy 
moral practices of our society (Book III). 
 So Kant’s most promising strategies for rejecting the appro-
priateness of benevolent deception rely on a commitment never to treat 
humanity as a mere means, but always at the same time as an end. Now 
this kind of moral reasoning relies on a particular kind of philosophical 
anthropology, an account of human nature and of the self. For Kant, eve-
rything in the human personality that can be studied empirically is sub-
ject to, and determined by, causation. However, Kant asserts that there 
is, in addition to these determined phenomena, something else, a nou-
menal self, which is outside space and time. The noumenal self is fully 
and perfectly rational. When it chooses, it always chooses a morally 
permissible action. It is not possible for us to know, through the exercise 
of theoretical reason, that this noumenal self exists. But the noumenal 
                                                          
4 See Reeves Appropriate 382. Reeves does not see the ethics of the Lotus Sūtra as exclu-
sively consequentialist, since intentions matter too. But in Goodman 186-87, I show 
how to deal with this problem by moving to a subjective version of consequentialism. 
This kind of consequentialist theory can easily accommodate the role of intention in 
Buddhist ethics. 
5 As in the powerful example, “I will buy a toy train, but never sell one.”  
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self can be an object of belief, or faith (Ger. Glaube.) Belief in the nou-
menal self is necessary, according to Kant, in order to make the moral 
life possible.  
 How should we regard the ascription of a rational noumenal self 
to all humans? After all, Kant does not want to deny that people some-
times act irrationally. We do so whenever we do something wrong. So 
what is he asserting when he ascribes a perfectly rational nature to all of 
us, and tells us that morality requires us to respect it? We could see this 
rational nature as a mere capacity, as a conclusive presumption based on 
our ignorance, or as an ideal of reason. Let’s explore what each of these 
alternatives would involve. 
 One Kantian strategy would be to argue that the capacity for full 
rationality needs to be respected even in those people who rarely or 
never exercise it. So even in a case where we might know that the person 
in question will definitely do something irrational that will lead to mi-
sery, we still should not intervene deceptively or coercively to stop that 
person, out of respect for their capacity for rationality. 
 It strikes me that we will find this version of the argument from 
the Formula of Humanity plausible only if we have already been con-
vinced that humanity, the capacity to set ends and think rationally about 
how to attain them, has unconditional moral value, whereas happiness 
does not. It is only by severely downgrading our understanding of the 
value of this person’s happiness that we can see an intervention to pro-
tect it as wrong in virtue of infringing on a capacity that we know will 
not be exercised. Now Kant has a powerful argument for this under-
standing of moral value: the Regress to Humanity as an End. But al-
though this argument has been persuasive to many, it can reasonably be 
rejected. In particular, Buddhists can and should reject Kant’s argument. 
I make this case in my book, Consequences of Compassion (198-200), and I 
will not repeat it here.  
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 But can we in fact have the kind of knowledge I have been assum-
ing? Although Kant admits that people do make irrational choices, he 
also argues for severe limits to our ability to know the status of an action 
as rational or irrational. No one, not even the agent, can know for sure 
that an action was rational and free, since it may secretly have been 
done out of immoral motives. Moreover, although we might be able to 
know that someone else’s action was morally wrong, we can’t know what 
that other person takes her happiness to consist in, so we can’t know 
whether an action that strikes us as merely imprudent was actually ra-
tional or not.6 If it is impossible to know this information, then it makes 
sense that we would be obligated, in our relations with others, to conclu-
sively presume that they are acting rationally, since we cannot know 
otherwise. And in this case, the generally accepted existence of human 
irrationality can offer no support to a paternalist action or policy. In-
stead, we are bound to respect the rationality and autonomy of others 
and allow them to make their own decisions. We may never try to mani-
pulate their rationality with lies, especially for some alleged benefit to 
them, since this would be inconsistent with the dignity belonging to the 
free human nature which is always able to manifest in them. Paternalis-
tic deception would mean that you are trying to control others for what 
you think is their good, instead of allowing them to express their own 
autonomy by freely choosing in the context of knowing the truth. But 
according to Kant, respecting their autonomy is precisely what morality 
requires, both in general and in this kind of case. 
 Finally, we could propose that we regard the ascription of ratio-
nality to others as an “ideal of reason.” What would this involve? This 
way of working out Kant’s argument is developed by Christine Korsgaard 
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in her essay “Two Arguments Against Lying.”7 Freedom and rationality 
are not properties whose presence or absence can be known through 
empirical evidence or a priori theoretical reasoning: as Korsgaard writes, 
“Actual conduct, then, does not provide evidence for or against free-
dom” (352). Instead, there is a practical and moral requirement to as-
cribe freedom and rationality to ourselves and others. Theoretical 
evidence can give us some guidance about which entities this require-
ment might apply to: we are unlikely to face a moral requirement to 
treat rocks as free and autonomous beings, for example. But in applying 
concepts of freedom to adolescents or to the mentally ill, there are ines-
capable cases of practical judgment that cannot be settled by any theo-
retical considerations: “We must decide who to count as a free rational 
being” (356). Moreover, according to Korsgaard, “The pressure of the 
moral law is towards treating every human being as a free rational being, 
regardless of actual facts” (352). Paternalist lies directed at normal adult 
humans would push directly against this moral pressure. On this inter-
pretation of Kant’s argument, in the absence of theoretical knowledge, 
we must make a choice; but certain choices, such as treating normal 
adults as appropriate objects of paternalist deception, are ruled out by 
the respect we owe to others.  
 What kind of account could Mahāyāna Buddhists, such as the 
people who composed the Lotus Sūtra, offer as an alternative to Kant’s 
view? We could start, of course, with the doctrine of no self. Buddhists 
claim that we have a powerful, innate, largely subconscious commitment 
to the view that each of us exists as a real thing (Skt. dravyasat.) But this 
view is a mistake. Special, trans-empirical entities such as the soul or the 
noumenal self are utterly nonexistent fabrications, made up to enable 
philosophers to offer spurious justifications for this innate mistake. The 
individual person exists as a mere conceptual construction out of more 
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basic materials. These more basic materials may themselves, in turn, be 
the products of conceptual construction. On the view of the Abhidharma 
traditions, the process of reduction will eventually terminate in a collec-
tion of absolutely simple mental and physical phenomena. But according 
to the Madhyamaka view, we will never find anything that is not concep-
tually constructed. When we indicate, point out, think about, or refer to 
things, we can never avoid using categories that are created by our 
minds; and none of the entities we relate to or interact with can exist 
apart from these categories. Above all, our own existence has this same 
status: we do not exist as real, objective entities; we people exist only 
from a certain point of view. 
 The doctrine of no self has, alone, few implications relevant to 
our question. These implications emerge only when we conjoin it with a 
Buddhist analysis of the emotions. A number of Indian Buddhist texts 
present or presuppose a cognitivist view of emotions, closely analogous 
to that of the ancient Stoics. On this kind of view, emotions are not seen 
as non-representational, mute drives or urges; they are caused by, and 
saturated with, representational judgments. In the case of reactive emo-
tions (Skt. kleśa) such as hatred, greed, desire, competitiveness, and 
pride, which dominate the minds of ordinary beings in cyclic existence, 
these judgments are comprehensively false. This view of the nature of 
emotions can be documented in several important Mahāyāna sources. In 
the Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti, for example, the title character says: “Re-
verend Upāli, passions consist of conceptualizations” (Thurman 31). A 
number of passages that do not directly support cognitivism neverthe-
less indicate that reactive emotions are caused by false judgments. 
Vimalakīrti says that sickness “arises from the passions that result from 
unreal mental constructions” (Thurman 45). In Ārya Śūra’s Garland of 
Birth Stories (Jātaka-mālā), similarly, we read: “Just as fire consumes the 
stick that kindles it, so anger destroys the man whose false notions give 
rise to it” (Khoroche 138). 
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 Once they have arisen from mistaken conceptual judgments, 
reactive emotions then proceed to make the original problem worse by 
deluding and confusing us. This is why Śāntideva, in the Introduction to 
the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life, says that anger is a “deceiver” (Crosby and 
Skilton 50). Ārya Śūra explains this view eloquently, again in relation to 
anger: 
He whose presence makes one blind, whose absence makes one 
clear-sighted—he stirred within me but did not escape me: Anger, 
I mean, who injures the man who harbors him … Anger makes 
him oblivious of the path to success lying open before him; in-
stead, he stays away from it and so is deprived of fame and suc-
cess … Usually he turns stupidly quarrelsome and too dull-witted 
to discern what is good for him and what bad. (Khoroche 137-8) 
Although anger is particularly destructive in this regard, it’s important 
to stress that the other reactive emotions are deceivers too. Desire, for 
example, often makes us overestimate just how good it would be for us 
to get the thing we want. Given that ordinary people spend most of their 
time oscillating from one reactive emotion to another, it follows that 
they spend most of their time being deceived by their own irrational pat-
terns. This claim helps us understand the nature of the dream in which 
most of us live. Much of what we relate to, think about and care about 
consists of unreal projections created by our irrational thoughts and 
emotions. To see the world as it is, free from these projections, is a major 
component of what it is to be awake (Skt. Buddha.) 
 On Kant’s view of ethics, no profound theoretical knowledge or 
spiritual insight is required to do the right thing. Absolutely everyone is 
able to know what is right and what is wrong, even in difficult cases, al-
though most cannot articulate this knowledge as a universal principle.8 
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arrived at its principle. To be sure, such reason does not think of this principle abstract-
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By contrast, the Lotus Sūtra, along with other Mahāyāna Sūtras, describes 
humans as deeply confused, misunderstanding the world around them in 
ways that make it impossible for them to see the moral status and conse-
quences of their actions clearly. Thus the Sūtra of Innumerable Meanings, 
considered part of the threefold Lotus Sūtra, tells us: 
All living beings, however, make delusory distinctions: weighing 
whether something is this or that; whether it is a gain or a loss. 
Bad thoughts come to them, producing a variety of evil actions. 
They transmigrate within the six states undergoing all kinds of 
suffering and harm, from which they cannot escape during in-
numerable billions of eons. (Reeves Classic 34) 
 From a Buddhist point of view, then, ordinary people are very 
closely analogous to the insane: “The world is a confusion of insane 
people striving to delude themselves” (Crosby and Skilton 94). Common 
sense tells us that a therapist dealing with a gravely mentally ill patient 
would be perfectly justified in going along with some aspects of the pa-
tient’s delusional structure if doing so would make it possible for the pa-
tient to be more comfortable, less distressed, or less dangerous. This 
would be a clear case of weak paternalism, and we would see it as moral-
ly acceptable. But if the real truth is that we, the normal humans, are all 
crazy, then the same framework applies to us. Similar analogies could be 
drawn to the permissible treatment of the profoundly retarded, and, of 
course, of small children. This account allows us to make perfect sense of 
the way in which the Lotus Sūtra uses analogies that sound like weak pa-
                                                                                                                                                
ly in its universal form, but does always have it actually in view and does use it as the 
standard of judgment. It would here be easy to show how ordinary reason, with this 
compass in hand, is well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good or 
evil, in accordance with duty, or contrary to duty, if we do not in the least try to teach 
reason anything new but only make it attend, as Socrates did, to its own principle—and 
thereby do we show that neither science nor philosophy is needed in order to know 
what one must do to be honest and good, and even wise and virtuous. Indeed we might 
even have conjectured beforehand that cognizance of what every man is obligated to 
do, and hence also to know, would be available to every man, even the most ordinary.” 
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ternalism to justify ethical prescriptions that would normally be seen as 
strong paternalism. On the Mahāyāna Buddhist view, the basic assump-
tion of the distinction between the weak and strong versions of paternal-
ism is a mistake: ordinary adult humans are not particularly rational. So 
what would look to most people like strong paternalism—namely, the 
use of deception on normal adults for their benefit—actually counts as 
weak paternalism, and as a result, will be easier to justify than we might 
have thought. As practiced by the Buddhas, paternalistic deception is an 
appropriate response to the profound delusions built into the mindset 
that creates the human realm.  
Evaluating the Models 
Between these two theoretical models—of humans as free, rational, au-
tonomous, dignified moral agents who must be given the chance to make 
their own decisions with full information, and of ordinary people as con-
fused, immature, irrational, struggling beings who can appropriately be 
deceived for their own good—which is more true to the way things are? 
Recent developments in psychology and related sciences have dealt se-
vere blows to the Kantian framework and provided strong support to the 
views of the Lotus Sūtra. The social sciences have long been dominated by 
methodological rationalism, the project of understanding society on the 
assumption that people are rational in their decision-making. But today, 
methodological rationalism is in full retreat, routed by the experimental 
findings of behavioral economics and dismayed by the manifest wreck-
age of a financial system devastated by irrational choices.  
One simple example of predictable human irrationality comes 
from an experiment designed by two professors of business at MIT, who 
set up an auction for Boston Celtics tickets. As Jonah Lehrer explains,  
Half the participants in the auction were informed that they had 
to pay with cash; the other half were told they had to pay with 
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credit cards. [The experimenters] then averaged the bids for the 
two different groups. Lo and behold, the average credit card bid 
was twice as high as the average cash bid. When people used 
their Visas and MasterCards, their bids were much more reckless. 
(Lehrer 86) 
This kind of experiment can go far towards explaining why, in the dec-
ade leading up to the present crisis, Americans have been borrowing 
more than they are saving and spending more than they can afford. Of 
course, there is no rationally justifiable explanation for the difference; 
the only possible explanation relies on the psychological unpleasantness 
the subjects experienced in actually parting with cash, as compared to 
how psychologically easy it is simply to charge a purchase. 
 Experiments by Dan Ariely have confirmed the existence of a 
striking phenomenon known as “arbitrary coherence.” Ariely offered 
business students a list of five goods, including electronics, chocolates, 
and bottles of wine. He asked them to write down the last two digits of 
their social security numbers, expressed as dollar amounts, and then in-
dicate whether they would be willing to pay that sum for each of the 
goods. He then held a sealed-bid auction, with real money, for each of 
these products. Astonishingly, the amounts that the students bid for the 
items were strongly correlated with the last two digits of their social se-
curity numbers. The effect was dramatic:  
The top 20 percent, for instance, bid an average of $56 for the 
cordless keyboard; the bottom 20 percent bid an average of $16. 
In the end, we could see that students with social security num-
bers ending in the upper 20 percent placed bids that were 216 to 
346 percent higher than those of the students with social security 
numbers ending in the lowest 20 percent.  (Ariely 28) 
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 The students in this experiment were not totally lacking in eco-
nomic logic. As Ariely writes,  
When we looked at the bids for the two pairs of related items (the 
two wines and the two computer components), their relative pric-
es seemed incredibly logical. Everyone was willing to pay more for 
the keyboard than for the trackball—and also pay more for the 
1996 Hermitage than for the 1998 Côtes du Rhône (Ariely 29).  
However, the absolute amounts the students were willing to bid were 
profoundly influenced by an utterly irrelevant and non-rational factor: 
the random influence of their social security numbers. This experiment 
helps to illuminate both the enduring strengths and the long-overlooked 
limitations of economic theories based on methodological rationalism. It 
should also cast serious doubt on the idea that, when we are not acting 
wrongly, we make choices out of an intelligible faculty of practical rea-
son. 
 Some empirical psychological evidence of irrationality helps to 
confirm the Buddhist view that reactive emotions, such as anger, cause 
us to have distorted and inaccurate beliefs. As one review article ex-
plains, 
[A]nger elicits a kind of “defensive optimism,” in which angry 
people systematically de-emphasize the importance and poten-
tial impact on the self of the negative events (Hemenover & 
Zhang, 2004.) Finally, these effects appear even when angry sub-
jects rate the likelihood of events for which anger is a predispos-
ing factor. That is, even though chronically angry people are 
more likely to have cardiovascular problems (Fredrickson et al., 
2000; Williams et al., 2000), experience divorce, and have difficul-
ty at work (Caspi, Elder, & Bem, 1987), angry people rate them-
selves as significantly less likely than the average person to 
Goodman, Paternalist Deception in the Lotus Sūtra 16 
experience these problems (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). (Lerner 
and Tiedens 124) 
Thus Śāntideva was right to think of anger as a deceiver. 
 One striking experiment offers further support for Buddhist 
claims about the irrational and counterproductive nature of anger and 
the desire for revenge. Carlsmith, Wilson, and Gilbert created an expe-
riment in which undergraduate students who had just concluded a stan-
dard public goods-type prisoners’ dilemma interaction were given the 
opportunity to spend some of their money to punish a participant who 
had urged them all to cooperate and who then herself defected. This par-
ticipant was actually a computer, but the experimental subjects thought 
they were punishing another student who had cheated them. Some stu-
dents were asked to predict how they would feel if given the opportunity 
to punish the free rider. Others went through the prisoners’ dilemma 
trial but were not given the opportunity to engage in punishment. 
 Those subjects given the opportunity to predict their feelings 
stated that getting the chance to inflict punishment on the free rider 
would make them feel better. The students who were allowed to inflict 
the punishment reported that they would have felt worse had they not 
gotten the opportunity to punish. Both of these beliefs, however, were 
false. In fact, those students who were able to inflict punishment and did 
so were less happy than those who were not given the opportunity to 
punish. The experimenters concluded that this worsened affect was due 
at least in part to the fact that those who punished spent significantly 
more time thinking about the free rider’s behavior (Carlsmith et al., 1320 
and passim). This experiment gives us a clear example of a certain kind of 
emotion causing us to have a false belief. It also constitutes a plausible 
case of irrationality, since almost everyone has had the opportunity to 
punish others in large or small ways in the past, and yet the belief this 
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experiment exposed as false, namely that punishment leads to catharsis 
and thus to feeling better, persists in numerous human cultures. 
 These examples are in no way atypical. They could be multiplied 
at great length. Much of the work of experimental psychology over 
many decades has been devoted to finding forms of irrational behavior 
in humans. Each of them separately casts doubt on our self-image as ra-
tional choosers. Together, they render that self-image fundamentally 
untenable. 
 Just how does this experimental evidence bear on the two com-
peting pictures of philosophical anthropology sketched earlier? It should 
be emphasized that the mere fact that people are sometimes irrational 
does not in any way contradict Kant’s view. The problems for Kant arise 
from the claim that people are sometimes predictably irrational. If there 
are empirically discoverable, statistically robust patterns of irrationality 
that people in general tend to exhibit, then we can sometimes be in a 
position to know—not with certainty, but with the degree of reasonable 
confidence that is all we can ever expect in practical matters—that 
someone has been, is being, or will be irrational in making a certain deci-
sion. If this kind of knowledge is ever available to us, then the “conclu-
sive presumption based on ignorance” argument cannot be successful. 
 What effect does this evidence have on the “ideal of reason” form 
of the Kantian view? Perhaps we find in Kant a conception of rationality 
so strong that no theoretical evidence could ever be sufficient to estab-
lish its presence. But to justify paternalist deception, the presence of this 
robust kind of rationality is not what we need to establish: we need its 
absence. And when an experimental subject is prone to arbitrary cohe-
rence, that subject is not being rational, either in a Kantian or any other 
sense. The experiments described above make it possible to know in ad-
vance that a certain group of people will not respond to a situation ra-
tionally; so theoretical reason can establish the premise that paternalist 
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deception needs to draw on. Of course, even if they will react irrationally 
and we know this, they might still retain the mere capacity for Kantian 
freedom; but if we have rejected the Regress to Humanity as an End, 
there is insufficient motivation for regarding respect for this capacity as 
so morally important as to override what we can know about these 
people’s interests and the potential imminent threats to them. I con-
clude that none of the Kantian strategies I have considered are success-
ful in defending an unqualified rejection of paternalistic deception. 
 The psychology experiments I have mentioned threaten not only 
Kant’s critique of benevolent deception, but also his broader views about 
the self and about how human thinking works. They push us away from a 
picture of a perfect rationality arising from a mysterious noumenal 
realm, and toward a picture of humans managing to cope with the world 
around us through a wide variety of evolved heuristics, tricks, and 
kludges. This is the view of rationality developed by Dennett in his clas-
sic book Elbow Room. For Dennett, rational thinking arose through an un-
planned, unguided process of natural selection, and it is implemented in 
an imperfect, buggy but immensely flexible and powerful physical ma-
chine, the brain. According to Dennett, 
The perfect Kantian will, which would be able to respond with 
perfect fidelity to all good reasons, is a physical impossibility; 
neither determinism nor indeterminism could accommodate it … 
We are not infinitely but only extraordinarily sensitive and ver-
satile considerers of reasons. (49) 
We might question whether full awakening (Skt. bodhi) will be possible in 
this picture. It may well be that both karma and the possibility of awa-
kening are a result of neuroplasticity, of the adaptability of the physical 
basis of our minds. But until we awaken, those who understand the limi-
tations of our rationality may sometimes be in a position to manipulate 
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us deceptively for our own good; and if we understand the kind of beings 
we are, there are strong reasons to think that we should not object. 
The Catch 
Should we, then, happily ride off into the sunrise of a paternalistic uto-
pia, in which our spiritual and political leaders regularly deceive and 
coerce us for our own benefit? If we are disturbed, or indeed frightened, 
by such a prospect, we should not try to rehabilitate Kant’s philosophical 
anthropology; there really is nothing about us that should rule us out 
absolutely as objects of benevolent deception. Yet there is a severe prob-
lem with endorsing paternalism in practice. Paternalism is rightly exer-
cised by adults over children; surely we cannot accept the idea that 
eight-year-olds could use paternalistic deception or coercion on other 
eight-year-olds. But if we are confused children, we may wonder wheth-
er the politicians and spiritual teachers we actually have are mature 
enough to function as our parents. 
 When we turn our attention to politics, it is blindingly clear that 
the answer is no. Just reflect for a moment on the American federal legis-
lature, the Congress. While running for election to Congress, politicians 
attempt to tell the voters whatever they may want to hear. Ordinary cit-
izens, in turn, typically cast their votes on the basis of racial or religious 
group membership, non-rational forms of identity, physical appearance, 
or inaccurate beliefs fostered by misleading television advertisements. 
Even if they make a sincere effort to choose in an informed and reasona-
ble way, citizens in the voting booth are subject to the very same forms 
of irrationality and bias that plague them in their individual decisions. 
Moreover, the choice they usually face includes only two candidates 
with a realistic shot at winning; both of these candidates may be very 
seriously suboptimal, and the voters may have to select the lesser of two 
evils. 
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 Once they arrive in Congress, legislators regularly, and with no 
sense of shame, make decisions in order to promote the interests of their 
own district, or even of their largest campaign contributors, at the ex-
pense of the public good. Actual laws, including those that will impose 
coercive sanctions on citizens, are written through a messy process of 
log-rolling and horse-trading. The politicians are focused on getting ree-
lected, or possibly on the immensely lucrative jobs as lobbyists they may 
receive when they leave the Congress. Taking this system as a whole, 
does it seem like a source of benevolent, disinterested, authoritative 
guidance, free from any taint of irrationality? On the contrary, it seems 
like we may fervently wish to be left alone to make our own mistakes, 
rather than being subjected to coercive or deceptive control by such a 
comprehensively flawed and irrational system.  
 Perhaps the only form of paternalism it would make sense to to-
lerate from such a political system would be what Sunstein and Thaler 
have called “libertarian paternalism.” Here the state intervenes to 
change the default option, thereby bringing about better social out-
comes, but giving everyone the choice to do otherwise than what it sug-
gests. So, for example, some people fail to sign up for IRA retirement 
savings plans that are available at their work, out of laziness, confusion, 
or weakness of will, thereby condemning themselves to a penurious old 
age. But if they were signed up automatically, as the default option, few 
would opt out. Government intervention to get their employer to change 
from an opt-in system to an opt-out system would be an example of li-
bertarian paternalism. In this way, if someone has an immensely impor-
tant reason to maximize their income now—say, an inordinately 
expensive but temporary medical crisis—that person could opt out of the 
system. Thus libertarian paternalism does not involve coercion or decep-
tion, and does not limit our freedom. Even the politicians we have, oper-
ating in the political system we have, can probably be trusted with this 
relatively weak but useful tool.  
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 The Lotus Sūtra’s ethics of benevolent paternalism was probably 
never intended to apply to political leaders, except perhaps insofar as 
those leaders are themselves advanced bodhisattvas. But if the ethical 
views found therein are to have any relevance at all to practice, it must 
turn out that spiritual teachers can sometimes practice deception as a 
form of appropriate means. And perhaps it’s plausible that they are bet-
ter equipped to do so than the people who run our government. Certain-
ly there is no shortage of people who claim to be accomplished spiritual 
masters but are actually charlatans and frauds. But those who are ge-
nuinely qualified to be Buddhist teachers must have some authentic ex-
perience of the way things really are, a form of experience that will 
make them more predisposed than most to use whatever capacities they 
have for the genuine, long-term benefit of those who accept their teach-
ings. 
 It’s important to emphasize again that the idea that the teacher 
can tell students what they need to hear at the time—which may not be 
what is actually true—is accepted, in some form, very broadly in the 
Buddhist world. Any tradition of interpretation that makes use of a dis-
tinction between teachings of provisional meaning (Skt. neyārtha, Tib. 
drang don) and teachings of definitive meaning (Skt. nītārtha, Tib. nges 
don) is thereby accepting that the Buddha does not tell everyone the 
whole truth, and may make statements that do not reflect ultimate truth 
but do help the listeners to move forward in their own spiritual jour-
neys.  
Now the Lotus Sūtra unambiguously regards this way of teaching 
as appropriate not just for the Buddha himself but for other spiritual 
teachers as well. Not only Buddhas, but also advanced bodhisattvas, are 
described as using appropriate means. (Reeves Classic 24) And this view 
about who can use paternalist deception is not restricted to the Lotus 
Sūtra, but is widespread in the Indian Mahāyāna tradition. We see this, 
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for example, in the often-repeated injunctions to teachers not to present 
the doctrine of emptiness to those who are not ready to understand it. 
So the Lotus Sūtra is simply presenting, in somewhat clearer, starker and 
more extreme forms, a view to which Mahāyāna Buddhists are indepen-
dently firmly committed. 
Indeed, contemporary spiritual teachers from Asian traditions 
have frequently made use of this form of teaching. A mild form of pater-
nalist deception is illustrated in this charming story about the great Ti-
betan Buddhist lama, Kalu Rinpoche: 
A Canadian woman, one of his first Western disciples, visited him 
a few months before he passed away. He said, “Do you remember 
that first time we met? I asked your age, then told you that you 
had reached the ideal age and stage—neither too old, nor too 
young—to practice Buddhism.” 
The woman had been forty-something at the time. Now, 
more than twenty years later, she replied, “Of course I remember! 
That meeting changed my life.” She had let her career slide and 
had eventually entered retreat, first a three-year retreat, then a 
life devoted to contemplation and retreat that continues to this 
day. 
Rinpoche smiled a little impishly and said, “Well, right af-
ter you left, the next person who came to see me was a young 
woman in her early twenties, and I told her exactly the same 
thing!” (Zangpo 23) 
A more serious, but still plausibly justified, example of this type occurred 
when Kalu Rinpoche was approached by a beginning student who asked 
to be taught the meditation practices of the Shangs pa bKa’ rgyud li-
neage. He told the student, falsely, that the lineage had died out and no 
longer existed. If the student was not ready to receive these teachings, 
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but could benefit from other teachings Kalu Rinpoche could give him, 
then this seems like an acceptable example of appropriate means. That 
same student later wrote,  
Buddhists are very comfortable with the Buddha’s and his follow-
ers’ dedication to enlightenment above all else. For example, my 
Canadian friend and I profited immensely from Kalu Rinpoche’s 
concern for us, which was far more important to him than an 
empty notion of honesty at all costs. (Zangpo 25-26) 
 Nevertheless, there is some reason to be wary of a view that al-
lows teachers to deceive their students. To explain why, we might say 
that since real human teachers of today are not fully awake, they still 
have blind spots. And the trouble with your blind spots is precisely that 
you can’t see them. If you give teachers permission to disregard other-
wise binding moral rules—such as “don’t lie”—for the greater benefit of 
others, you make it possible for them to promote the good much more 
effectively. But you also risk the possibility that their blind spots might 
turn out to coincide with the areas in which they’re being given the 
power to break the rules. This scenario could lead to disaster; and as an-
yone familiar with the history of American Buddhism knows, this danger 
is not merely hypothetical. 
 So the permission to engage in paternalist deception is a danger-
ous gift, both practically and morally. But we should not conclude that 
there is safety in a complete prohibition of this type of deception. Sup-
pose, for example, that emptiness is the way things are, but that those 
who hear the teaching of emptiness before they are properly spiritually 
prepared will have a tendency to misinterpret emptiness as nihilism and 
therefore to abandon all moral discipline, becoming both monstrous and 
miserable. These views seem to be central to much of Indian Mahāyāna. 
If they are correct, then a norm to the effect that a teacher must always 
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tell any student the whole truth about any subject would very likely be 
more dangerous than the Lotus Sūtra’s ethic of paternalist deception.  
 It’s possible to agree that a qualified Buddhist teacher may tell 
different students contradictory things for their own benefit without 
accepting the stronger view that there are no rules at all that should 
bind such a teacher. One might hold, for example, that although teachers 
who are well on the way to awakening may lie to students, there is an 
absolute prohibition on teachers having sex with students. Alternatively, 
one might try to handle this very difficult and sensitive problem in a way 
consistent with the “no rules” view. Thus it would be possible to argue 
that although there is no exceptionless prohibition against sex between 
teachers and students, a request by a teacher to a student for sex is so 
unlikely to be a compassionate and helpful gesture, and so likely to be 
the expression of a selfish agenda, that the making of such a request 
should be seen by the student as prima facie evidence that this teacher 
can’t be trusted with permission to break the rules. Paternalist decep-
tion, on the other hand, would not count as such evidence, although a 
student could certainly regard instances of hypocrisy or obviously sel-
fish deception as impeaching the teacher’s credibility. 
 I have argued that paternalist deception by teachers is a feature 
of the Mahāyāna quite generally, but some would argue that it is not a 
feature of Buddhism as such. In particular, Theravādins might argue that 
the Lotus Sūtra’s views on upāya are a contingent, historical product of 
the early Mahāyānists’ unwillingness to admit to being innovators. We 
can hardly escape the conclusion that in the intellectual environment 
the early Mahāyāna practitioners faced, they did not have the option of 
claiming to be making progress—progress in ethical ideals, progress in 
meditation techniques, progress in philosophical formulations. They 
were forced to attribute deception to the historical Buddha precisely be-
cause they were forced to attribute their own, innovative teachings to 
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him. Theravādins, on the other hand, can and do claim that during his 
forty years of teaching, the historical Buddha never told a lie. So is their 
lineage exempt from the charge of paternalist deception? 
 This issue depends crucially on how we interpret the concept of 
conventional truth. It’s well known that, according to both the 
Theravāda Abhidhamma and the Sanskrit Abhidharma traditions, state-
ments about composite material objects and sentient beings are never 
ultimately true, but only conventionally true. As I have argued at length 
before, the most natural interpretation of this teaching, in the context of 
these particular traditions, is that ultimate truth is just truth, whereas 
conventional truth is something less—similar in some ways to fictional 
truth, and in other ways to approximate truth (Goodman “Vaibhāṣika”). 
If this interpretation is correct, then most of the Buddha’s teachings 
were strictly and literally false. In the same way, a high school physics 
instructor, when lecturing on Newtonian physics, mostly says things 
that are strictly false—though they are highly useful, both pedagogically 
and practically, and approximately true. 
 Some scholars reject this account of conventional truth in the 
Abhidhamma traditions; so let’s assume I’m wrong about this issue, and 
that for the Theravāda—as is the case for Madhyamaka—conventional 
truth actually is a kind of truth. Then a Theravādin could defensibly 
claim that the Buddha never used paternalist deception, in the strict 
sense, since he never told a lie. On the other hand, the historical Buddha, 
as he is presented in the Pāli Canon, was certainly willing to mislead stu-
dents for their own good. He was therefore prepared to carry out a mild-
er form of the same kind of teaching strategy. 
 To see this, let’s consider a well-known text from the Dīgha 
Nikāya: namely, the Tevijja Sutta. This Theravādin scripture is famous for 
its epistemological critique of monotheism. The young Brahmin 
Vāseṭṭha asks the Buddha which of the Brahmin teachers of his day can 
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guide him to his religious goal, union with the god Brahmā. But the 
Buddha persuades him that none of these Brahmins is in any position to 
know how to be united with Brahmā, since they have not seen that deity 
and have no reliable evidence about him.  
In this portion of the text, the Buddha’s arguments would be reasonably 
familiar to someone like Richard Dawkins. But then, the dialogue takes 
what, to many readers, is a completely unexpected turn. The Buddha 
says: 
“Vāseṭṭha, it might be said that such a man on being asked the 
way might be confused or perplexed—but the Tathāgata, on being 
asked about the Brahmā world and the way to get there, would 
certainly not be confused or perplexed. For, Vāseṭṭha, I know 
Brahmā and the world of Brahmā, and the path of practice whe-
reby the world of Brahmā may be gained.” 
At this Vāseṭṭha said: “Reverend Gotama, I have heard 
them say: ‘The ascetic Gotama teaches the way to union with 
Brahmā.’ It would be good if the Reverend Gotama were to teach 
us the way to union with Brahmā, may the Reverend Gotama help 
the people of Brahmā!” (Walshe 193) 
The Buddha then instructs Vāseṭṭha that to reach the world of Brahmā, a 
disciple must take ordination, keep moral discipline, develop meditative 
stability up to the first jhāna, and then thoroughly practice the Four Di-
vine Abidings (Pāli brahma-vihāra), which are lovingkindness, compas-
sion, joy, and equanimity. 
 This passage does not portray the historical Buddha as a liar: 
what he tells Vāseṭṭha is strictly and literally true. But Vāseṭṭha is being 
seriously misled. He thinks he is hearing instructions about the final re-
ligious goal, about freedom from cyclic existence—as he puts it at the 
beginning of the sutta, “the path of salvation that leads one who follows 
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it to union with Brahmā” (Walshe 187)—where Brahmā is undoubtedly to 
be understood as the supreme deity of the universe, in either a monothe-
ist or a monist sense. But on the Buddha’s own view, that’s not what 
Vāseṭṭha is getting. The Buddha sees himself as giving Vāseṭṭha instruc-
tions on how to be reborn as a god in a long-lasting, but impermanent, 
heaven, a heaven that is squarely inside cyclic existence and in no sense 
represents a liberation from it. The Buddha could have told Vāseṭṭha 
this, but he didn’t; perhaps he had good reasons to believe that, given 
the details of the young Brahmin’s current psychological state, by prac-
ticing with the goal of union with Brahmā, Vāseṭṭha would make more 
progress than he would if he had been given a more accurate under-
standing of the nature of liberation in Buddhism. Or perhaps the Buddha 
knew that by working with the grain of Vāseṭṭha’s worldview, rather 
than against it, he had a better chance of persuading the young man to 
engage in beneficial activities. On either understanding, the Buddha is 
promoting Vāseṭṭha’s welfare by deliberately bringing it about that he 
will have an incorrect understanding of the nature of the goal of his own 
spiritual practice. This may not be paternalist deception in a strict sense, 
but it’s certainly reasonably close.  
 This article has sketched a way of defending the paternalist views 
of the Lotus Sūtra, which as we have seen, points clearly and accurately to 
an uncomfortable, dangerous, but unavoidable normative feature of a 
Buddhist worldview. The requirement for teachers to adjust their teach-
ings to the needs, interests and degrees of spiritual development of their 
various students, thereby opening themselves to the charge of dishones-
ty, is not an unfortunate innovation foisted on the Buddhist tradition by 
the Lotus Sūtra. It is an inevitable feature of a religious system which 
seeks to provide advanced students with guidance leading to a radical 
cognitive and affective transformation, while also functioning as a 
source of ethical values and moral discipline for large and populous so-
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cieties. From a Buddhist perspective, it’s hard to see how you avoid ex-
pecting the tradition to do both of those things.  
I conclude that at least Mahāyāna Buddhists, and perhaps even 
Buddhists generally, are unavoidably committed to endorsing a form of 
weak paternalism; and given their understanding of human psychology, 
their view has implications that some would classify as strong paternal-
ism. They are not required to endorse, and probably should not endorse, 
most forms of paternalist deception by political leaders, but only by cer-
tain advanced spiritual practitioners in their teaching activities. The 
ideal of a teacher who is utterly uninhibited and ruthless in using what-
ever means are available to bring students to awakening as quickly as 
possible can be both deeply appealing and deeply disturbing. But Budd-
hist practice is not about being comfortable. And there is no viable ethi-
cal objection to the conduct of such a teacher, always assuming that it 
actually works as advertised. In a world scarred and wounded by the re-
sults of greed, hatred and delusion, we need all the awakening we can 
get.9 
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